Much of our everyday knowledge is risky. This not only includes personal judgments, but the results of measurement, data obtained from references or by report, the results of statistical testing, etc. There are two (often opposed) views in artificial intelligence on how to handle risky empirical knowledge. One view, characterized often by modal or nonmonotonic logics, is that the structure of such knowledge should be captured by the formal logical properties of a set of sentences, if we can just get the logic right. The other view takes probability to be central to the characterization of risky knowledge, but often does not allow for the tentative or corrigible acceptance of a set of sentences. We examine a view, based on -acceptability, that combines both probability and modality. A statement is -accepted if the probability of its denial is at most , where is taken to be a fixed small parameter as is customary in the practice of statistical testing. We show that given a body of evidence Γ δ and a threshold , the set of -accepted statements Γ gives rise to the logical structure of the classical modal system EMN, the smallest classical modal system E supplemented by the axiom schemas M:
• "Do you know when the next plane to L.A. leaves?" "Yes; 11:04; I just looked it up." • You know that it is raining; you just looked out the window and saw that it was. • John knows the length of the table; he just measured it and knows that it is 42.0 ± 0.10 inches.
• Mary knows that John loves her.
• We know that of the next thousand births in this big hospital, at least 400 will be male.
• Since we just obtained evidence in the 0.01 rejection region, we know that H 0 is false. • The specific gravity of pure copper is known.
Then again, similar sounding items are not known.
• You do not know that the last plane to LA tonight will leave at exactly 10:00pm. • You do not know that the length of the table is exactly 63.40 in. long. • You do not know that it will rain on Saturday, since your only reason for thinking so is that we are planning a picnic. • You do not know that the wheel will land on red. You have no reason to doubt the honesty of the apparatus. • You do not know the conductivity of copper, since our measurements might all be in error.
In general, particularly in the case of measurement, it seems unreasonable to deny that many statements, despite the fact that the evidence can render them no more than highly probable, can qualify as knowledge. Many statements that we consider "knowledge" are corrigible. You know that it is raining because you see rain from your window, but it is not impossible that it is April Fools' day and your neighbor upstairs has installed a lot of sprinklers above your window. This is a form of the qualification problem. Except in special cases, we can never list all the qualifications that would be needed to make a statement incorrigible. To ensure that knowledge is never corrigible, we will have to confine ourselves to tautologies.
On the other hand the statements mentioned in the second group above are too corrigible; exact quantitative statements fall in this class. There is no good reason to think that measurements are exact. Of course the appropriate rounding error may be implicit, as when we say of a bolt that it is a half inch in diameter or of the distance between two cities that it is 914 miles. However any inference or action relying on a measurement being of an exact value almost certainly will fail.
In a rough and ready way, we can surely make the distinction between the kinds of statements that we can claim to know on the basis of evidence, and the kinds of statements that we cannot claim to know on the basis of evidence. We will argue that one way to characterize the first kind of statements, the risky knowledge, is by the bounded objective risk of error of the statements relative to the set of evidence. The statements qualified as risky knowledge carry a maximum risk of error so small the statements can be regarded as practically certain, and we are prepared to make decisions based on the acceptance of these statements.
Of course there is the respectable point of view that holds that nothing corrigible can rightly be claimed as knowledge [1] . According to Carnap [2] , to claim to know a general empirical fact is just a shorthand way of saying that, relative to the evidence we have, its probability is high. There are three arguments that lead us to be skeptical of this approach. First, it requires a sharp distinction between propositions that can be known directly ("There is a cat on the mat," for example?)presumably these need not always be qualified by probabilities -and propositions that can only be rendered probable ("Approximately 51% of human births are the births of males," perhaps?). This is a notoriously difficult distinction to draw. Second, although this approach requires prior probabilities, there is no agreed-upon way of assigning them. Third, from the point of view of knowledge representation, the probabilistic approach faces overwhelming feasibility and complexity problems. For these reasons we will leave to one side the point of view that regards all knowledge as "merely probable", and take the objection "Well you do not really know …; it is merely probable," to be ingenuous or quibbling unless there are specific grounds for assigning a lower probability than is assigned to other statements admittedly known.
What is the logical structure of the set of conclusions that may be obtained by nonmonotonic or inductive inference from a body of evidence? Is it a deductively closed theory, something weaker, something stronger? In what follows, we make minimal assumptions about evidence, and take inductive inference to be based on probabilistic thresholding [3] . We show that the structure of the set of inferred statements corresponds to a classical modal logic, in which the necessity operator is interpreted as "it is known that." This logic is not closed under conjunction, but is otherwise normal.
We want our risky knowledge to be objectively justified by the evidence. We shall interpret that to mean that the maximum probability, relative to the evidence Γ δ , that a statement S in Γ is false is to be no more than the fixed value . We shall explain briefly what we mean by "probability" and state a number of its properties. We shall then formalize the acceptability of statements in the body of risky knowledge Γ and discuss some of the properties of risky knowledge.
Evidential probability
We will follow the treatment of probability in [4] . On this approach evidential probability is interval-valued, defined for a (two-sorted) first order language, relativized to evidence which includes known statistical frequencies. The language includes distribution statements, as in our example, and statistical statements of the form %η(τ, ρ, p, q) , 1 where η is a sequence of variables, and the statement as a whole says that among the tuples satisfying ρ between a fraction p and a fraction q will also satisfy τ . For example, given that we know that between 70% and 80% of the balls in an urn are black, this might be expressed as "%x(black(x), urn(x), 0.7, 0.8)". 1 We follow Quine [5] in using quasi-quotation (corners) to specify the forms of expressions in our formal language. Thus S ↔ T becomes a specific biconditional expression on the replacement of S and T by specific formulas of the language.
Knowing that the distribution of errors of measurement of length by method M are approximately normally distributed N(0.0, 0.0004), and that a measurement of object a yielded the value 11.31, we can be 0.95 confident that the length of a lies between 11.27 and 11.35, i.e., the probability of "11.27 ≤ length(a) ≤ 11.35" is [0.95, 0.95]. A test of a hypothesis of size 0.05 that yields a point in the rejection region supports the denial of the null hypothesis H 0 to the degree [0.95, 1], or runs a risk of error of at most 0.05. If the test does not yield a point in the rejection region, no conclusion follows at all.
There are constraints on the terms that can take the role of each of the arguments in a statistical statement, as well as conditions specifying what constitutes a candidate statement for a given target probability. We will omit the details here but they can be found in [4] .
Probability will be construed metalinguistically, so probability statements will not appear in the formal language. If L is the language, then the domain of the probability function Prob is L × ℘ (L), and its range is intervals [p, q], where 0 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ 1. Thus the probability of a statement S, given the background knowledge Γ δ , is represented by Prob(S, Γ δ ).
It is on sets of statements that include statistical knowledge that probabilities are based. For example, suppose we have "%x(black(x), urn(x), 0.7, 0.8)" as above. If we know nothing about the next ball to be drawn that indicates that it is special in any way with respect to color, we would say that the probability of the sentence "The next ball to be drawn is black," relative to what we know, is [0.7, 0.8]. Additional evidence could lead to a different probability interval, for example if we knew the approximate frequency with which black balls are drawn from the urn, and this frequency conflicted with [0.7, 0.8] (perhaps because black balls are a lot bigger than the other balls), we would use this as our guide.
Given a statement S and background knowledge Γ δ , there are many statements in Γ δ of the form τ (α) known to have the same truth value as S, where α is known to belong to some reference class ρ and where there is some known statistical connection between ρ and τ , expressed by a statement of the form %η(τ, ρ, p, q) . In the presence of S ↔ τ (α) and ρ(α) in Γ δ , the statistical statement %η(τ, ρ, p, q) is a candidate for determining the probability of S. The problem, however, is that there are many such candidates and their numbers may not agree with each other. This is the classic problem of the reference class [6] . If the interval [p, q] mentioned by one statistical statement is strictly included in the interval [p , q ] mentioned by another, we say that the first statement is stronger than the other. If neither interval is stronger than the other and they are not equal, we say that the statements conflict. Our approach to resolving the reference class problem is to eliminate conflicting candidate statistical statements from consideration according to the three principles stated below.
(1) [Richness] If two statistical statements conflict and the first statistical statement is based on a marginal distribution of the joint distribution on which the second is based, ignore the first. This gives conditional probabilities pride of place when they conflict with the corresponding marginalized probabilities. Conditional probabilities defeat marginalized probabilities.
(2) [Specificity] If two statistical statements that survive the principle of richness conflict and the second statistical statement employs a reference formula that logically entails the reference formula employed by the first, ignore the first. This embodies the well-known principle of specificity: in case of conflict more specific reference classes defeat less specific ones.
Those statistical statements not disregarded by the principles of richness and specificity are called relevant. The cover of a set of statistical statements is the shortest interval including all the intervals mentioned in the statistical statements. Given a set of statistical statements K, a set of statistical statements K is closed under difference with respect to K iff the intervals I associated with K is a subset of the intervals I associated with K and I contains every interval in I that conflicts with an interval in I .
(3) [Strength]
The probability of S is the cover that is the shortest among all covers of non-empty sets of statistical statements closed under difference with respect to the set of relevant statistical statements; alternatively it is the intersection of all such covers.
The probability of a statement S is the shortest cover of a collection of statements closed under difference with respect to the relevant statistical statements. None of these statements can be eliminated as contributing to the probability of S. In the ideal case there is essentially only one relevant statistical statement, in the sense that all remaining undefeated statistical statements will mention the same interval [p, q] . In other cases there will be conflicting statements that cannot be eliminated. It is worth noting that in this case there is no single "reference class" from which the probability is derived, but that nevertheless the probability is based on knowledge of frequencies, and the probability such derived is unique. Further discussion of these principles may be found in [7] .
Put formally, we have the following definition. 
4) Any statistical statement in Γ δ satisfying items 1-3 that is not in K can be ignored according to the three principles above.
(5) Any statistical statement in K cannot be ignored according to the three principles above.
There are a number of properties about probability as we construe it that we will simply enumerate here. A more detailed discussion may be found in [4] .
Properties 1.
(1) Given a body of evidence Γ δ , every statement S of our language has a probability: For all S and all Γ δ , there are p and q such that Prob(S, Γ δ ) = [p, q].
(2) Probability is unique: If Prob(S, Γ δ ) = [p, q] and Prob(S, Γ δ ) = [r, s] then p = r and q = s.
(3) If S and T are known to have the same truth value, i.e., if the biconditional S ↔ T is in Γ δ , they have the same probability:
The probability of the negation of a statement can be determined by the probability of the statement itself:
Every probability is based on frequencies that are known in Γ δ to hold in the world.
It is natural to ask about the relationship between evidential probability and the more usual axiomatic approaches. Since evidential probability is interval valued, it can hardly satisfy the usual axioms for probability. However, It can be shown that if Γ δ is consistent, then there exists a one place classical probability function P whose domain is L, and that satisfies
The story with regard to conditional probability is a little more complicated. Of course all probabilities are essentially conditional, and that is clearly the case for evidential probability, as the evidential probability of a statement is relative to the set of sentences Γ δ taken to be the evidence. However, as Levi showed in [8] , there may be no one place classical probability function P such that P(S|T) = P( S ∧ T )/P(T) ∈ Prob(S, Γ δ ∪ {T}). That is, the evidential probability of S relative to the corpus Γ δ supplemented by evidence T need not be compatible with any conditional probability based on Γ δ alone. This is a consequence, as Levi observes, of our third principle, the principle of strength.
While one should not abandon conditioning lightly, it should be observed that in many instances there is no conflict, and in particular evidential probability can adjudicate between classical inference and Bayesian inference when there is conflict. For more details see [9] .
Risky knowledge
Risky knowledge consists of the set of statements whose chances of error are so small they are negligible for present purposes; in other words, these statements are practically certain. Riskiness is not a standalone property of a statement. It is relativized to two components: an evidential corpus consisting of uncontested statements and a risk parameter denoting the maximum risk of error deemed acceptable.
Evidential corpus Γ δ
We are interested in the objective risk of error. Our assessment of risk is to be based on evidence, which in fact will include statistical knowledge (as when we accept as "known" the approximate results of measurement). We must make a sharp distinction between the set of sentences constituting the evidence, and the set of nonmonotonically or inductively inferred sentences. The evidence itself may be uncertain, but we shall suppose that it carries less risk of error than the risky knowledge we derive from it.
Let us take the set of sentences constituting the evidence to be Γ δ and the set of sentences constituting our risky knowledge Γ . δ represents the risk of error (degree of corrigibility) of our evidence, and represents the risk of error of what we infer from the evidence. For example, we obtain the error distribution of a method of measurement from a statistical analysis of its calibration results; but we take that distribution for granted, as evidence, when we regard the result of a measurement as giving the probable value of some quantity. The set of sentences Γ δ may even have the same structure as Γ , and in turn may be derived from a set of less risky evidence statements Γ γ . Such a structure would allow the question of inductive or uncertain support or justification to be raised at any level, but would not, of course, require it.
We shall assume that Γ δ , the set of evidential statements, is not empty, and that it contains logical and mathematical truths. This is reasonable as a tautology can be given probability [1, 1] , and thus would be included in any corpus that requires its sentences to run a risk of error of no more than ≥ 0. Indeed, in the most stringent case, Γ δ would contain only logical and mathematical truths. In a broader setting, the evidential corpus contains the statements whose truth status are not open to dispute in the current frame. These may include law-like premises, observations and measurements that were taken carefully, and other evidence that could be false but whose possibility of error one does not seriously entertain at the present moment.
The body of evidence is held to be statically true only for the derivation of the respective body of risky knowledge. When statements in the evidential corpus are found to be false, or at least when their truths are in unacceptable doubt, the corpus should be revised to reflect this change in what is regarded as true. Similarly, new evidence that comes into light may be incorporated into the evidential corpus. Any change in the evidential corpus would prompt a re-evaluation of the risk of error of the statements that should be included into the body of risky knowledge.
Note that, however, the sets of sentences, Γ δ and Γ , are not deductively closed; we will examine this more closely in the following sections.
The risk parameter
The small number " " denoting the maximum risk of error of a sentence (relative to the evidence set) is to be construed as a fixed number, rather than a variable that approaches a limit. Both Ernest Adams and Judea Pearl have sought to make a connection between high probability and modal logic, but both have taken probabilities arbitrarily close to one as corresponding to knowledge. Adams requires that for A to be a reasonable consequence of the set of sentences S, for any there must be a positive δ such that for every probability function, if the probability of every sentence in S is greater than 1 − δ, then the probability of A is at least 1 − [10, 11] . Pearl's approach similarly involves quantification over possible probability functions [12, 13] . Bacchus et al. again take the degree of belief appropriate to a statement to be the proportion or limiting proportion of intended first order models in which the statement is true [14] .
All of these approaches involve matters that go well beyond what we may reasonably suppose to be available to us as empirical enquirers. In real life we do not have access to probabilities arbitrarily close to one. One cannot determine from empirical evidence whether a threshold condition involving infinitesimals is satisfied or even satisfiable. Thus we have chosen to follow the model of hypothesis testing in statistics. In hypothesis testing the null hypothesis is rejected (and its complement accepted) when the chance of false rejection, given the data at hand, is less than a specified fixed, finite number α. This criterion can be objectively tested for acceptance or rejection. Similarly, we accept a statement into the body of risky knowledge Γ when the chance of error in doing so is less than a fixed finite amount , given that we have accepted a body of evidence that suffers a chance of no more than a fixed finite amount δ of being in error. Such a regimen is empirically constructive, allowing for scientific testing.
-Acceptability
We will now formalize the idea of -acceptability and risky knowledge within the evidential probability framework. It is natural to suggest that it is worth accepting a statement S as known if there is only a negligible chance that it is wrong.
Put in terms of probability, we might say that it is reasonable to accept a statement into Γ when the maximum probability of its denial relative to what we take as evidence, Γ δ , is less than or equal to . Since evidential probability is interval-valued, this suggests the following definition of Γ , our body of risky knowledge, in terms of our body of evidence Γ δ :
We stipulate that a sentence belongs to the set of statements accepted at level when the maximum chance of its being wrong (q) is less than or equal to our tolerance for error, . This reflects -and is in part motivated by -the theory of testing statistical hypotheses. We say that each of the sentences satisfying the conditions for S in Definition 2 is -accepted (relative to the set of evidence Γ δ ).
A few easy theorems will establish some important facts about the structure of Γ . First we restate Definition 2 in a more positive form, making use of Property 4 of evidential probability in Section 2:
In other words, Γ contains those statements whose probabilities relative to Γ δ are at least 1 − . Both the lower and upper bounds of the interval-valued probability are in play. The upper bound of the probability of a statement constrains the lower bound of the probability of its negation and thus its maximum chance of error.
Several important facts concerning the use of inference in Γ , in particular adjunction, are captured by the following theorems.
Theorem 1. If S ∈ Γ and S T then T ∈ Γ .
This follows from Property 5 of evidential probability in Section 2.
The set of risky knowledge Γ is thus logically closed in the sense that the logical consequences of every sentence in the set is also in the set. This is, as a number of commentators have pointed out, demanding. It is a standard that cannot be met by any actual inquirer. One might ask what place this has in a program of practical certainty and how this is different from having an infinitesimal for the risk parameter , since both issues pertain to impossible feats for the mere human. Infinitesimals are never verifiable for empirical statements, whereas logical consequence can be established in selected cases. If we think of the set of risky knowledge as a standard, it is a standard toward which we may approach. Once it has been shown that a sentence T is a logical consequence of a sentence S, where S is practically certain, we should be willing to accept T also as practically certain. We may also identify fragments of the logic that admits an efficient proof procedure.
Theorem 1 leads to a limited principle of adjunction, as stated in the next theorem. However, we do not have adjunction in general:
The probability of S and of T may each exceed 1 − , while the probability of their conjunction does not.
Thus, adjunction is retained only in special cases. The lack of adjunction in general, and therefore also deductive closure, is one of the reasons why normal modal logics cannot be used to characterize risky knowledge. In normal modal logics, adjunction is everywhere valid, even in the smallest normal modal logic, K.
Below we will consider instead classical, or sub-normal, modal logics, in which adjunction does not necessarily hold.
Classical modal logics
We will denote by and 3 the necessity and possibility operators, and P the set of propositional constants. A modal system contains the axioms and rules of inference of (non-modal) propositional logic.
A system of modal logic is normal iff it contains the axiom schema
and is closed under the rule of inference
The smallest normal modal system is K, defined by (3) and (RK).
A modal system is classical iff it contains the axiom schema (3) above and is closed under the rule of inference
The modal system E, consisting of (3) and (RE), is the smallest classical modal system. We will examine the classical systems obtained by placing various axioms on top of the system E, but first let us consider the semantics of classical modal logics.
Neighborhood semantics
Normal modal logics can be characterized by Kripke models. Classical modal logics however, with their weaker nonnormal constraints, cannot be characterized by standard Kripke models.
Following up an idea of Montague [15] and Scott [16] , Chellas [17] fleshed out the idea of "minimal models" for characterizing classical (non-normal) modal logics. Since then, such models have been generalized to the first order case for both normal and classical modal logics [18] . We will follow the practice of Montague-Scott and Arló-Costa in referring to the models underlying these logics as "neighborhood models." Our concerns here however will be restricted to the propositional case, which suffices for our purposes.
Let us first describe the terminology for neighborhood models. (2) N : W → 2 2 W is a function from the set of worlds to sets of sets of worlds [neighborhood function];
(3) | : W × P → {0, 1} is a function from the set of worlds and the set of propositional constants to the set of truth values [truth assignment function].
In this formulation, sentences are identified with sets of worlds. Specifically, a sentence is represented by the maximal set of worlds in which it is true. A set of sentences is thus represented by a set of sets of worlds.
Informally, in a neighborhood model, for each world w ∈ W , there is an associated neighborhood N(w) (given by the neighborhood function N) consisting of a set of sentences (or, equivalently, a set of sets of worlds). The neighborhood of a world contains the set of sentences that are deemed "necessary" at that world. The non-modal formulas are evaluated with respect to the world w, and the modal formulas are evaluated with respect to the neighborhood set of w.
We will extend the truth assignment function | to denote the valuation function of the neighborhood model M, and write w | M φ when the sentence φ is true at the world w under model M. In addition to the usual rules governing the truth of non-modal formulas with connectives, we have the following regarding modal formulas. 
The truth of modal formulas at a world w ∈ W under the model M is defined as follows.
The truth set of a formula contains all the worlds in which it is true. Recall that the neighborhood N(w) associated with a world w contains all the sentences (each represented by a set of worlds) that are necessary at w. Thus, the modal formula φ is true at w iff the truth set of φ is a member of N(w). Similarly, the formula 3φ is true at w iff the truth set of the negation of φ is not a member of N(w). This conforms to the axiom schema (3), corresponding to the conventional notion that the two modal operators are interdefinable: 3 ≡ ¬ ¬.
There is little restriction on the structure of the neighborhood function. The neighborhood N(w) of a world w in general may be any arbitrary set of sets of worlds, including the empty set; it may also be empty (that is, it does not contain the empty set or anything else). It is possible to have both ||φ|| M ∈ N(w) and || ¬φ || M ∈ N(w), which is not a direct contradiction. (We will have more to say about this later.) There need not be any inherent relationship between the members of N(w), between the neighborhoods of different worlds in a model, or between the neighborhood of a world and the world itself.
We will consider in the next section some axioms of classical modal systems and their corresponding semantic constraints on the neighborhood models. In Section 5 we will investigate which of these constraints pertain to the system of -acceptability.
Constraints on the neighborhood
There are three conditions on neighborhood models that are of interest to us. Given a neighborhood model M= W , N, | , for any world w ∈ W and sets of worlds W 1 and W 2 , let us define the following conditions on the neighborhood function N.
These conditions correspond to the following schemas in classical modal systems. (The symbol denotes the truth constant.)
.
That is, the schema (M) is valid in the class of neighborhood models that satisfy the constraint (m), and similarly for the pairs of axiom and neighborhood constraint (C) and (c), and (N) and (n).
Knowledge as -acceptability
So far we have been referring to the two modal operators as the necessity and possibility operators. There can be other interpretations of these operators; they can be construed epistemically or deontically. The operator may be identified variously with, for instance, the notion of knowledge, belief, obligation, or requirements.
The interpretation we are interested in here is knowledge construed as -acceptability. In this case, φ is interpreted as that φ is -accepted, in other words, φ is practically certain with respect to some level of risk . We have the following definition.
Definition 5. Given a set of evidence Γ δ and a threshold , for any non-modal formula φ, let
φ is true if φ is accepted with a risk of error no more than . By the same token, 3 φ is true if φ is possible:
Given a set of evidence Γ δ and a threshold , for any non-modal formula φ,
In other words, 3 φ is true if ¬φ is not practically certain at the risk level 1 − , or equivalently, the probability that φ is true is not bounded (from above) by . The non-modal atomic propositions and compound formulas are evaluated with respect to Γ δ according to the usual rules.
There is a correspondence between the set of "necessary" formulas as defined above and the set of risky knowledge.
Corollary 3. Given a set of evidence Γ δ and a threshold , the set of risky knowledge Γ is the set of non-modal formulas
That is, singly nested modal formulas can be evaluated against Γ .
φ is equivalent to the condition φ ∈ Γ , and 3 φ is equivalent to the condition ¬φ ∈ Γ .
The modal system of -acceptability
Recall that E is the smallest classical modal system. A family of classical modal logics can be obtained by adopting in addition different combinations of the three axiom schemas (M), (C), and (N) introduced in Section 4.2. We will denote such systems by the letter E followed by the list of axiom schemas sanctioned in each system. For instance, EMC stands for the classical modal system containing the schemas (M) and (C).
Most of these classical modal systems are sub-normal; they are weaker than the smallest normal modal system K. The system K can be denoted by EMCN. In other words, K is equivalent to the basic classical system E with all three of the additional schemas (M), (C), and (N).
Among this family of classical modal logics, the system that is of particular interest to us is EMN. More specifically, we will focus on the part of EMN that does not contain nested modal operators. Let us first examine this segment of the modal system.
We will identify the -acceptability operator with the traditional necessity operator . Let EMN i be the set of formulas valid in EMN with at most i nested modal operators. EMN 0 is thus the set of valid non-modal formulas in EMN and EMN 1 the set of valid formulas with no nested modal operators.
Theorem 4. All formulas in EMN 1 can be derived from axioms with non-nested modal operators in EMN.
Proof. We will show that whenever there is a proof for a formula in EMN 1 , there is a proof for this formula using only axioms with non-nested modal operators in EMN.
First of all, we focus only on steps that directly participate in the proof. Spurious steps involving nested modal formulas that are not used to support the derivation of the conclusion can be safely ignored.
In EMN each of the axiom schemas (3), (M) and (N) preserves the level of nesting of the modal operators in the component formulas. The rule of inference (RE) increases the level of nesting by one. These axioms and rule of inference cannot be used to obtain a formula in EMN 1 from formulas of higher modal depth.
The axioms and rules of inference of propositional logic, for example, modus ponens, may decrease the level of nesting of the resulting formula. However, these axioms and rules treat each sub-formula headed by a modal operator atomically, that is, their application does not depend on the internal composition of the modal sub-formulas. If a nested modal sub-formula is involved in a propositional axiom or rule of inference, it can be uniformly substituted by a formula with an equivalent truth status but without nested modal operators.
Thus all valid formulas in EMN 1 can be derived from instances of the axiom schemas of EMN with at most one level of nesting. Now let us show that -acceptability gives rise to a classical modal system. Property 5 of evidential probability in Section 2 yields the axiom schema (M) in the non-nested case. Since φ ∧ ψ φ (and also ψ), whenever (φ ∧ ψ) , we also have φ (and also ψ ).
Property 6 of evidential probability in Section 2 yields the axiom schema (N) in the non-nested case. The body of evidence Γ δ contains the non-modal tautologies φ, and therefore Prob(φ, Γ δ ) = [1, 1] and we have Γ δ | φ for all 0 ≤ ≤ 1.
Thus, the set of risky knowledge Γ is the set of "necessary" non-modal sentences derivable from the corresponding EMN modal system.
Note however, the axiom schema (C) is not valid in a modal system based on -acceptability. Intuitively this corresponds to the rejection of adjunction. As pointed out in Theorem 3, two formulas may each be individually -accepted, while their conjunction has a probability that is not high enough to warrant its admittance into Γ . The limited form of adjunction in Theorem 2 is available: If S and S T and S T , then (T ∧ T ) . It is possible to have both ||φ|| M ∈ N(w) and || ¬φ || M ∈ N(w), which translates to φ and ¬φ . This does not constitute a contradiction, and since φ ∧ ¬φ does not automatically give rise to (φ ∧ ¬φ) , there is no cause for worry. This situation however is not likely to arise given a consistent evidential corpus Γ δ and a sensible choice of : If < 0.5, then by Property 4 of evidential probability in Section 2, if φ ∈ Γ , then ¬φ ∈ Γ , and so ||φ|| M ∈ N(w) but || ¬φ || M ∈ N(w).
Note again that although we do not have adjunction, a certain form of logical omniscience persists. A body of risky knowledge Γ contains the tautologies, as well as the logical consequences derivable from a single -acceptable premise. For instance, if φ is accepted, so is φ ∨ ψ for all ψ. It is only when multiple -accepted premises are involved, each supported independently to a degree of 1 − , that their consequences may not be clearly admissible into Γ . (M), (C), and (N) . The minimal normal system K is the minimal classical system E augmented with the three axiom schemas. The modal system for -acceptability is sub-normal then because it rejects the axiom schema (C) responsible for adjunction.
Every normal system possesses all three of the axiom schemas

Monotonicity and non-monotonicity
Classical modal systems satisfying condition (m) are called monotonic. The monotonic modal system can also be characterized by the rule of inference φ → ψ φ → ψ . Condition (m) is equivalent to the following condition.
That is, the system is closed under the superset relation. Correspondingly (M) is equivalent to the following schema.
We have shown that the set of -accepted sentences Γ derived from a body of evidence Γ δ at a level of risk corresponds to a system containing the monotonic schema (M). This seems to suggest that -acceptability is monotonic. The characterization however only applies to inferences relativized to a fixed set of evidence. Monotonicity holds for inferences within the system: if ψ can be derived from φ with respect to Γ δ , it can also be derived from (φ ∧ φ ) with respect to Γ δ . This relationship no longer holds when the set of evidence or premises changes, for example, when it is expanded to include additional evidence. A sentence ψ may be acceptable with respect to a set of premises Γ δ , but not acceptable with respect to an expanded premise set Γ δ ⊃ Γ δ . In the former case the probability space is given by Γ δ ; in the latter case the probability space is given by Γ δ . The two conditional probability functions need not bear any monotonic relation to each other, even when both are based on the same underlying probability function.
This bears on risky knowledge particularly in view of the principles for resolving conflicts in the framework of evidential probability, on which risky knowledge is based. We discussed the principle of strength with respect to expanding the set of evidence Γ δ in Section 2. We give a simple example involving the principle of specificity here.
Suppose we have, among the sentences in the body of evidence Γ δ , this statistical statement about the proportion of birds that fly: The nonmonotonicity of -acceptability stems from the acceptance, with respect to a set of evidence, of statements whose probability values warrant practical certainty even though they may not be provably certain. A statement may be -acceptable relative to a set of premises, but given further evidence the same statement may no longer be of a probability higher than 1 − and thus would have to be retracted.
Adjunction
The logic of risky knowledge does not contain the axiom (C) for conjunctive inference at the modal level. Multipleaccepted sentences do not necessarily lead to the -acceptance of their conjunction. The fact that we do not have adjunction may strike some people as disastrous. After all, adjunction is a basic form of inference. In mitigation, we point out that Theorem 2 shows that there are cases in which we clearly do have adjunction. What is required is that the items that are to be adjoined be derivable from a single statement that is itself acceptable.
When do we call on adjunction? When we have an argument that proceeds from a list of premises to a conclusion. This is convenient, and may be perspicuous, but is not essential; the same conclusion could be derived from the conjunction of the premises without using adjunction. Where it makes a difference is where the premises are individually supported by empirical evidence. But in this case the persuasiveness of the argument depends on the empirical support given to the conjunction of the premises. Too many premises, each only just acceptable, will not provide good support for a conclusion even when the conclusion does validly follow from the premises.
For example, let us consider a variant of the lottery paradox [19] . From "Cow #1 shows no unusual symptoms" and "If a cow shows no unusual symptoms then she will have a normal calf," one may infer "Cow #1 will have a normal calf." From a set of a thousand pairs of premises of that form, one may validly infer (making use of adjunction) that all thousand of the cows will have normal calves. But while the inference is valid, the conclusion is not one that should be believed. Why should the conclusion not be believed? Because while the generalization that if a cow shows no unusual symptoms she will have a normal calf is almost always upheld by events, and so should be ( -)accepted, we may also know that one time in a hundred it will be falsified. It is then almost certain that among a thousand cows we will encounter at least one instance of an abnormal calf.
Furthermore, note that although the conclusion about the thousand cows should not be believed, there is no particular premise that should be rejected. We know that some premise is false: either some cow does show unusual symptoms, or that some instance of the conditional, If cow i shows no unusual symptoms then cow i will have a normal calf, is false. It is pretty reasonable to conclude that the generalization is one of those that holds "for the most part" and to retain those conclusions that we can, even if their conjunction is not accepted. The alternatives would be to accept none of the conclusions at all, which seems over-cautious, or to reject some of the conclusions such that adjunction is restored, which seems arbitrary since the probabilities of the conclusions selected to be rejected would be at least as high as some of the retained conclusions.
To the extent that we are thinking of an argument as supporting its conclusion, any argument requires simultaneous (adjunctive) acceptance of its premises. Any doubt that infects the conjunction of the premises rightly throws a shadow on the conclusion. Except for notational convenience, any argument may be taken to have a single premise.
Many more people seem to have doubts about deductive closure than have doubts about conjunction. It is worth noting the connection between adjunction and deductive closure expressed by the following theorem: Theorem 7. If Γ is not empty and contains the first order consequences of any statement in it, then Γ is closed under conjunction if and only if Γ is deductively closed.
Related work
Much work has been done on formalizing probabilistic consequence based on high conditional probability thresholds. As we have discussed, approaches based on infinitesimals, for example [10] [11] [12] [13] , involve constructs that in many cases cannot be verified by the kind of observations available empirically. In addition, we have argued that unrestricted adjunction, endorsed by these approaches, is not desirable, as it leads to difficulties such as the lottery paradox.
High probability thresholds have also been investigated in axiomatic systems. System P [20] was analyzed with respect to a high probability nonmonotonic consequence relation, highlighting some limitations that make a logic based on the rules of System P unsatisfactory for nonmonotonic inference [21] . A weaker system, System O, was developed [22, 23] . It has been shown that System O is not complete, not even when restricted to the case of finite premise Horn rules, and any complete set of Horn postulates for such probabilistic consequence relations would involve an infinite number of rules [24] . A finite axiomatization might yet be achieved by the inclusion of non-Horn rules. In recent work a lossy version of high probability thresholds was advanced in which the threshold of maximum error increases as more uncertain premises are combined [25] .
Properties of inference in risky logic was investigated in [26] through a mapping from monotone neighborhood modal structures for EMN to polymodal Kripke structures. The relationship between high probability and classical modalities has also been studied in [27, 18] . The machinery for risky knowledge however is based on evidential probability, which is interval-valued and has properties that are different from standard probability, as discussed in Section 2. Probability has also been related to modal logic in other ways. For example, in [28] a modal operator was introduced to represent "being more probable than its negation". The resulting logic is non-adjunctive and therefore also classical. In a multi-agent setting, a set of modal operators has been used to denote "agent i assigns probability at least α" [29] [30] [31] .
Concluding remarks
Like the subjective Bayesians, we have said nothing so far about the sentences in Γ δ that are taken as evidence, though in fact we think they can be accounted for in a way similar to that in which the sentences of Γ can be accounted for. Presumably, this set of statements can be construed as risky, too. Unless one is seeking "ultimate" justification (whatever that may be) there is no dangerous circularity in this procedure. Given any degree of riskiness , we can ask for and receive objective justification of the statements in Γ , in terms of a less risky set of statements Γ δ . The set Γ δ in turn can be questioned; this amounts to treating Γ δ as having been derived from some even less risky set of statements Γ η . And the same can be asked of Γ η . In the extreme we have a set of tautologies consisting of only logical and analytic truths. That this can always be done provides us with all the non-circular objectivity we need. That it does provide us with objectivity is a consequence of the objectivity of probability as we construe it in [4] .
Note that δ is not necessarily smaller than in the above characterization. δ is the risk parameter for the evidence Γ δ , whereas is the risk parameter for the risky knowledge Γ relative to the acceptance of the evidence Γ δ . However, the cumulative chance of error of any statement in Γ is no greater than that of any statement in Γ δ , and thus Γ δ ⊆ Γ .
In practice, of course, we can be perfectly satisfied with a body of evidence Γ δ of some specified degree of maximal riskiness. What concerns us in practice is the question of whether that evidence provides adequate support for sentences in Γ , the corpus of practical certainties we use for making decisions and calculating expectations. Many of these practical certainties will be the relative frequency statements we need for grounding probabilities. Again, there need be no circularity.
Both the set of evidence Γ δ and the set of risky knowledge Γ are not deductively closed. This does not mean that they have no logical structure, although it does mean that using Γ as a guide to life may be non-trivial. In point of fact we can represent the structure of Γ as a modal logic, in which membership in the set of risky knowledge, Γ , is represented by the operator. This viewpoint ties a number of things together. Many people say that scientific inference is nonmonotonic. One standard way of looking at nonmonotonic logics is through modal interpretations. We are adding to that the idea that scientific inference is based, not on the avoidance of error, but on bounding or limiting error, for example, rejecting the null hypothesis H 0 at the 0.01 level.
Although the modal logic in question is weaker than normal modal logics, it will be useful to approach the logic of risky knowledge through the weaker classical modal logics. What is interesting about the results we have just presented is that they provide a reconciliation between an approach to knowledge in terms of probabilistic acceptance, and an approach to knowledge in terms of modal epistemic logics. We have shown that the same structure emerges when viewed in each way.
